‘Lemonisation’ and Information Asymmetry on the Educational Services Market in Ukraine
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15503/jecs2022.2.645.658Keywords:
educational services market, information technology, information asymmetry, education, ‘lemonisation’ of the marketAbstract
Aim. The article aims to analyse the manifestations of information asymmetry in the market of educational services to develop proposals for improving the communication programmes of higher education institutions of Ukraine.
Methods. The authors describe the display of information asymmetry in the market of educational services based on a sociological study among the 1st and 2nd-year students of Ukrainian universities, which aimed to study the criteria for choosing an educational programme. The authors used correlation analysis to assess the statistical significance of the influence of individual criteria on the selection of entrants. The survey was conducted at the universities in Ukraine that provide educational services on the bachelor’s degree specialities of 073 Management and 075 Marketing. A critical and comparative analysis of state regulatory measures to overcome information asymmetry was also applied.
Results. The annual decrease in the number of university entrants in Ukraine and around the world has led to increased competition among universities, resulting in an escalation of information asymmetry in the market of educational services and its ‘lemonisation’.
Conclusions. According to the results of the sociological study, despite the high availability of sources of information, at the time of entering the university, the vast majority of students did not consider themselves sufficiently informed about the benefits of studying in the chosen educational and professional programme. Several state regulatory measures have been taken to provide quality educational services in Ukraine and ensure unbiased information about universities. It was revealed that by allocating state-funded places for a specific speciality and university, the government significantly influences the choice of applicants. However, it should be noted that such impact is not very significant for applicants with high scores. Given this, the impact and effectiveness of both the state regulation system of universities in Ukraine and its specific instruments require further study.
Cognitive value. The study results contribute to overcoming the asymmetry of information in the market of educational services, serve as a methodological basis for improving the communication programmes of higher education institutions, promote healthy competition among them. The findings of this study can be considered an essential contribution to future research.
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Copyright (c) 2022 Liudmyla Kozak, Vitalii Kovalchuk, Iurii Gudz, Anna Novak
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