Pragmatic aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of education: a modern interpretation

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Abstract

Aim. The aim of the study is to analyse the basic philosophical ideas proposed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in education from the pragmatic standpoint.

Methods. The article is based on an extended literature review, which involves the use of such methods as interpretation (to explain incomprehensible and incomplete aspects of philosophical theory), comparative analysis (to compare Wittgenstein's views with the views of pragmatists) and historico-philosophical reconstruction (to build a complete pragmatico-analytic conception of Wittgenstein's philosophy of education).

Results. The study clarified the pragmatic aspect of Wittgenstein's reasoning about education. The author reconstructed and critically comprehended the features of Wittgenstein's pedagogical method, his views on the purpose and characteristics of learning, communication in the educational environment and the results of the pedagogical process.

Conclusion. Wittgenstein developed an original pedagogical method, which was a synthesis of his theoretical and practical generalisations based on personal experience of teaching and learning. He supplemented them with pragmatic ideas, which were both his own developments and the result of improving the ideas of pragmatic theory. This made it possible to form the basis of the pragmatico-analytic philosophy of education and to reinterpret its basic principles and ideas.

Key words: philosophy of education, Wittgenstein's pedagogical method, pragmatism.

Introduction

In the history of the philosophy of education, the legacy of Ludwig Wittgenstein occupies a significant place, because he managed to combine his own theoretical work with living, practical experience. Having learned from his teachers and senior colleagues – Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, George Edward Moore – the basics of analytic philosophising, Wittgenstein later

developed them to new logical and linguo-philosophical heights. Thus he inspired the philosophical investigations of his students and followers, including Norman Malcolm, Gertrude E. M. Anscombe, Geogr Henrik von Wright and many others. Although he dealt mainly with the philosophy of language, logic, epistemology and psychology, in his works there are some important ideas in the field of philosophy of education, which gives researchers reason to call him an "educational thinker" (Burbules & Peters, 2001, p. 16), "pedagogical Philosopher" (Peters, 2017, p. 29), "educator" (Stickney, 2017, p. 43), "a passionate and inspired teacher and philosopher" (Savickey, 2017, p. 63), "a philosopher who often uses educational situations to examine philosophical puzzles" (Maruyama, 2001, p. 51), etc.

Analysing Wittgenstein's educational thought and practice, researchers mostly appeal to the study of the memoirs of his students and contemporaries, as well as to the study of his own philosophical works (mostly in the "late" period) (Burbules & Peters, 2001, p. 16). However, this approach should be complemented by the idea that for a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy, the context of its formation must also be taken into account. Given that the evaluation of Wittgenstein's works by contemporaries did not always correspond to his own ideas and didactic tasks that he set for himself, we will first turn to his works and their philosophical context. It will be important to demonstrate that his philosophy of education was influenced by pragmatism, some of the ideas of which Wittgenstein improved but others, on the contrary, he criticised. In fact, the proposed research will clarify the main aspects of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy of education from a pragmatic perspective. For this purpose, it will be studied what Wittgenstein's pedagogical method was, how he described the learning process and specifics of intersubjective communication, as well as why the development of the ability to rule-following can be considered as one of the key learning outcomes.

Some practical remarks on Wittgenstein's pedagogical method

Wittgenstein formulated his own views on teaching during his long pedagogical career. It is known that he attended Vienna's Teacher Training College (1919-1920), taught in rural schools in Austria (1920-1926) and lectured in Cambridge (from 1929) (more detailed see Peters & Stickney, 2018, pp. 59-85). An analysis of Wittgenstein's philosophical works shows how much the acquired pedagogical experience influenced his philosophical method: in "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" he categorically formulated his own thoughts and was convinced that philosophical problems could be solved – on the contrary, in "Philosophical Investigations" the author mostly asked. He did it more than a thousand times, but most of his questions are left unanswered. If there was an answer, he often criticised it himself, because appropriate interpretation did not satisfy him, or raised new questions. The difference between

the approaches of early and late Wittgenstein is so striking that it can be interpreted as a pedagogical turn, which Charles James Barr Macmillan described as follows: "We often find him turning from a consideration of the meanings of a term or concept to ask, 'How was this learned?' or 'How would you teach it?' " (Macmillan, 1984, p. 7). Thus, the process of investigation was inextricably linked with learning.

Wittgenstein himself described his method of work as follows: "In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way…" (Gasking & Jackson, 1967, p. 52). That is, an understanding of a particular issue can arise only when, through numerous repetitions and detailed analysis of individual cases (both independently and with the teacher), the student gets a complete picture of what is happening. Only then will they have reason to continue on their own. However, students will move within the space outlined by the teacher. In order to overcome these limits, the student must acquire new skills and abilities. To do this, they will either have to find a new guide, or become one themselves.

It is noteworthy that back in 1969 Kuni T. Fann, characterising the pedagogical method of Wittgenstein, remarked: "… there is no better description of his method than 'learning by doing' " (Fann, 1969, p. 109). In fact, the concept of "learning by doing" is key to John Dewey's philosophy of education. This principle was consistently implemented by the American thinker in the activities of the University of Chicago Laboratory Schools, which he founded in 1896. According to this principle, learning becomes a process of acquiring the skills needed to solve practical life situations (Synytsia, 2020). As J. Dewey himself explained, "recognition of the natural course of development … always sets out with situations which involve learning by doing" (Dewey, 1916, p. 217). In other words, this approach is most in line with the nature of things. It allows not to waste time on the study of knowledge that the student will not be able to apply in everyday life, solving practical problems. The teacher should direct the efforts of students specifically to solving such tasks.

Emma McClure argues that the method Wittgenstein used to teach students at Cambridge, – "by means of examples and by exercises" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 208) – he had practiced previously, as a teacher in elementary school (McClure, 2017). This may explain the presence of many numbered passages, demonstrations, practical problems, as well as thought experiments or exercises in "Philosophical Investigations". However, such an alternative interpretation, to my mind, is somewhat narrowed, because it does not take into account the early works of the Austrian thinker. The numbering of the passages is much more characteristic of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," which was written before Wittgenstein began his teaching career. This work also has a consistent presentation of thought. Like teachers, the author divides the subject into components and researches them in detail. This approach is generally characteristic of logical analysis. In addition, the increase in the number of practical problems in "Philosophical Investigations" is to some extent also due to a change in the subject of research. Since Wittgenstein

focused on the study of everyday language, it is natural that such a method proved to be quite convenient for its analysis.

Michael A. Peters and James Marshall even drew attention to the fact that in general Wittgenstein's pedagogical method was also characterised by "vital repertoire of non-argumentational discursive forms – pictures, drawings, analogies, similes, jokes, equations, dialogues with himself, little narratives, questions and wrong answers, thought experiments, gnomic aphorisms, and so on" (Peters & Marshall, 1999, p. 175). Indeed, in the process of analysis, figurative thinking and numerous metaphors begin to play an important role for him (Gill, 1996; Burbules, 2017). This, of course, applies to the late period of his work. For example, to explain the nature of the meaning of the word, he writes about the beetle in the box (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 293); to outline the purpose of philosophy – he remarks we need to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 309); he compares philosophical ambiguities to a cloud that could be condensed into a drop of grammar (Wittgenstein, *PI*, XI); to describe how the fundamental principles of the system work, he uses the term hinges (on which all other statements are based) (Wittgenstein, *OC*, § 341). In addition, Wittgenstein used numerous images of learning. With their help it would be possible to clearly explain the content of unclear ideas. This informal approach is quite pragmatic. In particular, to explain the possibility of different interpretations of the same sign, Wittgenstein used the Jastrow's figure of the duck-rabbit or the figure of a double cross (Wittgenstein, *PI*, XI); and the idea of the uncertainty of syntax, if there is no semantics, the thinker illustrated with a simple triangle, which can mean many things – a triangular hole, a geometric drawing, a mountain, a wedge, an arrow, and so on (Wittgenstein, *PI*, XI). Until the speaker explains the meaning of undefined signs, he or she may not reach an understanding with the listeners.

Learning as practice

Wittgenstein understood that schooling reflected the trends of democratic development that exist in society. Therefore, the position of teachers and students is determined by the expectations placed on them by the government, based on the state's strategic interests and objectives. In 1948, Wittgenstein wrote: "I think the way people are educated nowadays tends to diminish their capacity for suffering. At present a school is reckoned good 'if the children have a good time'. And that used not to be the criterion" (Wittgenstein, *CV*, p. 71e). These considerations reflected the essence of the school reforms of the time (in particular, those carried out in the 1920s by Austrian government at the initiative of Otto Glöckel). They gave pupils the opportunity to show their abilities and talents more than before. However, the school continued to form in children only those talents that could later be used to build in the interests of the state, and not in the interests of each child as an individual. Such a pragmatic position on the part of the state may be appropriate in the case

of natural sciences, when it is important to learn the basics of the scientific method and solve difficult problems in the right way, but in the case of social sciences and philosophy in particular, such a way of teaching can have harmful consequences. As Wittgenstein remarked: "A present-day teacher of philosophy doesn't select food for their pupils with the aim of flattering their taste, but with the aim of changing it" (Wittgenstein, *CV*, p. 17e). On the one hand, it is indeed reasonable to assume that the child's tastes are not yet sufficiently formed, on the other – it is not entirely clear whether any attempt to change pupils' inclinations will not be harmed.

Constantly asking questions and not always giving answers, Wittgenstein taught to formulate their own view of things, to assert their own position. Given this question in the learning process, it may seem that he developed Socratic method. However, there was a significant difference between their approaches: if for the ancient Greek thinker it was important to finally get a definition, to justify his position, for Wittgenstein, on the contrary, it was the study itself that was important. Having given up his intention to create an ideal language that would be a too imperfect means to know the whole set of phenomena of the essentially dynamic world, he was well aware that our opinions about it could also change rapidly. Consequently, our views on what we call truth will change.

This position is anti-dogmatic and it clearly indicates the pragmatic motives in Wittgenstein's work. Therefore, he formulated the purpose of the educational process in a slightly different way. According to his approach, it is important for the teacher to constantly ask in order for students to be active in the process of acquiring knowledge. If these questions were answered by the teachers themselves, students (more broadly – readers) would not learn to think independently. It is no coincidence that he claimed: "Anything your reader can do, leave to him" (Wittgenstein, *CV*, p. 77e). Developing this idea, Michael Peters and James Marshall expressed Wittgenstein's main pedagogical aim in teaching, as follows: "The aim of the great educator is to teach us to think for ourselves" (Peters & Marshall, 1999, p. 189). It would be definitely wrong to assume that Wittgenstein intended to become a great teacher and pursued just such an aim. According to Wittgenstein students Douglas A. T. Gasking and Allan Cameron Jackson, their teacher's "technique of oral discussion" was such as to confuse the audience:

> Example was piled up on example. Sometimes the examples were fantastic… Sometimes the examples were just a reminder of some well-known homely fact. Always the case was given in concrete detail, described in down-to-earth everyday language. Nearly every single thing said was easy to follow and was usually not the sort of thing anyone would wish to dispute (Gasking & Jackson, 1962, p. 50).

Thus, Wittgenstein's lectures were mostly a monologue in which he asked questions not so much to the audience as to himself. Sometimes it was difficult to grasp the essence of his thoughts, so many of the students limited themselves to repeating what they heard from the teacher. Nevertheless, they were able to

directly observe the process of thinking and cognition. This was the greatest practical benefit of such lectures, which resembled a laboratory of thought and a means of improving practical skills. Another thing, could these students use this method on their own, outside the classroom? Wittgenstein was skeptical. He wrote:

> A teacher may get good, even astounding, results from his pupils while he is teaching them and yet not be a good teacher; because it may be that, while his pupils are directly under his influence, he raises them to a height which is not natural to them, without fostering their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline again as soon as the teacher leaves the classroom. Perhaps this is how it is with me (Wittgenstein, *CV*, p. 38e).

To protect students from dependence on the teacher, Wittgenstein intended to encourage them to formulate their own views on a particular issue, and thus to develop a strong belief in the truth of the information they understood. In addition, without faith, students would not be able to quickly learn the large amount of information that the teacher tells them. Moreover, as Wittgenstein remarked, "learning is based on believing" (Wittgenstein, *OC*, § 170). Students believe that the facts of specific sciences (geography, history, physics, etc.) reported by the teacher are true. To be sure of the truth of these facts, they will have to be verified experimentally. The verification process makes it possible to fix our own beliefs and to state that we know them. To know means nothing more than to get rid of doubts. They occur when the causes of a phenomenon are not clearly understood, when we cannot be sure that something was not missed or that an error was not made in the process of research. Even if the object of belief is true to the believer, that truth is subjective. Only in the process of one's own research, the results of which are supported by the conclusions of others, it will be possible to obtain true knowledge.

How is learning done?

According to Wittgenstein's interpretation, learning is a set of language-games. To demonstrate all their diversity, the thinker lists numerous examples from school practice, such as: "giving orders, and obeying them… constructing an object from a description (a drawing)… making up a story; and reading it; play-acting; singing catches… solving a problem in practical arithmetic; translating from one language into another; asking, thanking…" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 23). It should be noted that some of the language-games are only called such, although they may be without the use of language tools (for example, *thanking* can be done with a gesture, for *constructing an object from a drawing* we need only a picture, and thought processes sometimes do not require words and can occur with the help of visual images or objects. In these situations, it is not just about linguistic expressions, but about signs, and this is known to

be one of the basic categories of Pierce's semiotics, which has defined many cognitive strategies in pragmatism. Signs are not just language symbols, "a sign is either an *icon*, an *index*, or a *symbol*" (Peirce, *CP*, 2.304). They assume the existence of a specific object that they denote and an interpreter that will explain their meaning. Since icons and indexes can be interpreted in terms of symbols (in terms of language), Wittgenstein focuses on language (in particular to get rid of inaccuracies and ambiguities in interpretations). However, the fact remains that language-games include non-verbal means of expressing one's intentions and beliefs.

According to method of language-games, the purpose of learning is the process of communicating meanings. Given that, as Wittgenstein argued, "the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 23), it becomes clear that each of these meanings people find in specific life situations. Wittgenstein criticised the Augustinian theory of language, according to which the meanings of words are determined by objects and are probably already known to the child, who, however, can not yet express them (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 32). It seems that only nouns correspond to such a conception, and the meanings of other parts of speech, e. g. the names of activities or properties, can be learned just by knowing the meaning of nouns. Language learning involves much more complex mechanisms. Primitive language-games (such as pointing to an object with its simultaneous designation) (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 8) are good for illustrating how this happens in the simplest cases.

As Wittgenstein explained, "A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 5). Under the most basic conditions, the teacher names the word, and the student repeats it in the process of direct practice. In fact, in these practices he or she acquires the habit of doing something in a certain way. Thomas P. Crocker even compared Wittgenstein's practices and Peirce's Habits (Crocker, 1998). Both play an important cognitive and didactic function, as they allow to form a stable intellectual and emotional reaction to daily challenges. In other words, it forms our belief, or gives us a clear rule to follow. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Pierce asserted that "the essence of belief is the establishment of a habit" (Pierce, *CP*, 5.398), and Wittgenstein similarly argued that "… 'obeying a rule' is a practice" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 202). Everyday practices allow us to fix our belief and be sure of the truth of our knowledge.

Pragmatic aspects of communication

From the standpoint of the analytic philosopher, communication, regardless of whether it occurs in the process of interpersonal communication between participants in the learning process, or in absentia, as in the case between author and reader, should always be as precise as possible. As Wittgenstein

noted: "Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be said can be said clearly" (Wittgenstein, *TLP*, 4.116). Otherwise, any propositions we make will not be verifiable and will not be useful. We will deal with evaluative, not logical judgments. A similar requirement can be found in Pierce's "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878): "The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is, how to make our ideas clear" (Peirce, *CP*, 5.393). The only way to achieve this clearness is to determine what the relevant ideas mean, that is, to establish their meaning. Another thing, what should this clearness be? And isn't the strategy of Pierce's fallibilism most justified (Cooke, 2006), when any statement by definition cannot be absolutely true, because by increasing our knowledge, we will come to a different understanding of the world? Therefore, perhaps it is necessary to teach first of all that no dogmatism can be justified in the process of knowing the truth. However, it is important to understand what exactly will be learned and how it will be captured in words.

In the theory of pragmatism, it was immediately stated that discussions of meaning contain a subjective component, because, according to the pragmatic maxim, investigating our conception of the object, we intend to establish its "effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings" (Peirce, *CP*, 5.402). Therefore, it is not advisable to look for the meaning of the idea in itself, because it in itself means nothing. Similarly, the reduction of one idea to another will be ineffective. Meanings became dependent on the process and results of the subject's practical interaction with the objects of knowledge. These kinds of *practical bearings* can be interpreted as habits that a person begins to follow in life, using certain concepts. For his part, Wittgenstein similarly argued that "… the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 43). The term "meaning" can definitely be used in another way, but this definition very precisely describes the nature of meanings in communication.

The analytic approach to communication involves the division of the whole into individual elements and their detailed and comprehensive analysis. To explain the essence of a problem, Wittgenstein is known to have considered a large number of examples and various situations in which they may arise. At the level of individual facts it is possible to be more precise. The precision requirement is also met for formal languages. However, sometimes such a requirement in the communication process can lead to a misunderstanding. It is no coincidence that Wittgenstein, in a well-known example with *broom in the corner*, pointed to a possible misunderstanding when replacing broom in the sentence with broomstick and the brush (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 60). The fact is that a situation in which someone is asked to bring a certain item, and a situation in which the name of this item is replaced by a description of its components, are not identical. In the second case, the person who was told the description instead of the name may ask, is it not the subject that is denoted by this name? Thus, Wittgenstein intended to point out that excessive detail can lead to confusion in communication at the level of commands, requests and other performative utterances.

On the other hand, it is known that participants in communication can get much more information than can be expressed in words. Some things are just unspeakable, and they can't be said, they can only be shown. Wittgenstein stated, "What *can* be shown *cannot* be said" (Wittgenstein, *TLP*, 4.1212). He meant different kinds of feelings, experiences, certain aspects of understanding, as well as actions. Thus, even in the simplest language-game, when a person has to buy five red apples (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 1), he or she cannot describe the feeling of colour with words. Individuals must have in front of them or in memory a pattern that will be identified as red. There will also be many difficulties in understanding abstractions, such as the number five. When teachers explain the nature of number, they are not talking about its meaning, but about how to use it. Only later, reflecting on the nature of philosophical abstractions, the scientist will use various generalisations in much more complicated language-games.

It is also clear that words are not identical to feelings. We can only think of what others mean when they use the name of a certain feeling. For example, Wittgenstein argued that he might well think of (Denken) what Heidegger meant by Angst (von McGuinness (hrsg.), 2001, p. 68). However, attempts to express this would end in communicative failure. In this case, it is better to be silent. This state of affairs does not mean that certain meanings will be lost in silence. We are able to feel them mystically and thus go beyond language.

Wittgenstein well realised that communication acquires a pragmatic dimension, because in itself the "language-game" is "the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 7). By their actions the students very often confirm their own understanding of new information, and by his example the teacher convinces students sometimes much more than with the help of general recommendations. The teacher acts when they demonstrate or tell something and even when they think about something. In the latter case it will be a question of *spiritual* [mental, intellectual] activity (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 36). Such activity goes far beyond Michael Scott's analysis of actions as a complex of movements, words and behavioural reactions (Scott, 1996). Investigating such activity, Wittgenstein reached the level of solving puzzles in our culture and thinking, and not only language puzzles (Burbules & Peters, 2001, p. 18). Therefore, it is no coincidence that Wittgenstein pointed out the worldview differences that arise between members of different communities. These differences are caused by different value systems and societal principles. They undoubtedly affect understanding in the process of communication and consensus building (Wittgenstein, *RFGB*).

Rule-following as a result of learning

Wittgenstein used the methodology of logical behaviourism and was therefore convinced that the only way to make sure that students have learned correctly is their ability to act in certain life situations in accordance with the requirements of the rules of conduct. At first the teacher explains these rules,

and then checks how well the student has mastered them. The fewer random or systematic mistakes (after all, there is no fundamental difference between them) that students will make, the more skill they will acquire and the deeper their understanding will be. Wittgenstein compared systematic errors to bad habit, which must be weaned (Wittgenstein *PI*, § 143). Only then will students be able to change their *way of looking at things* (Wittgenstein *PI*, § 144). The absence of significant errors at a certain stage of learning new material will be for the teacher one of the indications that it is possible to proceed to the study of new material. As Wittgenstein noted, "the effect of any further *explanation* depends on his <pupil's> reaction" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 145). In other words, evidence that the student correctly understands the meaning of certain information will be the ability to apply it correctly. In this case, correctness of application will be defined in a pragmatic way – as the ability to follow the rule. It is important not only to give words the same meaning in certain situations, but also not to change the rule in new cases.

For example, a teacher may make sure that students have learned to act within certain limits, but as soon as they go beyond these limits, they can immediately begin to act differently. Wittgenstein described this situation in the example of a pupil who built the series of numbers "+2" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 185). The pupil performed this kind of operation correctly up to 1000. After that, he continued the series "+4", thinking that this is exactly what is needed, although the rule did not specify this instruction. From the teacher's point of view, this approach is clearly wrong, but, to pupil's mind, he did not make a mistake. In this regard, Wittgenstein pointed to the possibility of a skeptic paradox, by which "… every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 201). This was the danger of interpretations: within the theoretical constructions, which by definition are incomplete and imperfect, interpretations of certain actions can differ significantly and only if a person pays attention to the practice of word usage, they can determine whether a word is used correctly. Note that in this case, Pierce, for example, to overcome various doubts, used the concept of *practical certainty* (Peirce, *CP*, 2.664), because he understood that our knowledge is fundamentally wrong.

This position is known as fallibilism. According to it, scientific knowledge is fundamentally incomplete; it is only a system of interpretations that does not correspond to absolute truth. Since a mistake will still be found, it is important only who will have the right to state that the previous knowledge was not as true as the next, that one interpretation is better than another, and in some conflict situation only one of the parties does correctly. Remarkably, Wittgenstein in "On Certainty" (§ 298; 1950), Pierce in "The Fixation of Belief" (Peirce, *CP*, 5.358-5.387; 1877), and Dewey in "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry" (part 4; 1938) believed that it would be right to turn to a third party, a community of scientists, to resolve conflict situations (including cases in education). The use of a scientific method can make our beliefs strong and become a means of controlling the correct use of terms. Whenever a certain rule is violated,

the scientific community will have to react in some way and prevent similar situations in the future.

In fact, the scientific community develops its own criteria for how correctly a person follows the rule in specific life situations. Wittgenstein argued that forms of life are so diverse that they should not be reduced solely to their empirical manifestations. This was a certain difference with some pragmatists. For example, James stated that "the tendency known in philosophy as empiricism, becomes confirmed" (James, 1911, p. 98), but as it is known Wittgenstein advocated a more conceptual study of reality (and forms of life) through the prism of language analysis. Similarly, for Dewey the concept of experience as "the means and goal of education" (Dewey, 2015, p. 89) was one of the cornerstones of his philosophical conception, but for Wittgenstein private experience is something unique, known only to its owner (Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 272), and therefore the same experience can not be taught to others. It can be concluded that Wittgenstein studied the experience mostly in order to more clearly capture the nature of the meaning of the word (Campbell, 2012).

Finally, Wittgenstein complements Pierce's view of the role of the scientific community. Recognition of the right of the community of scientists to be a regulator, which makes our ideas about things more true, still needs to be realised. Wittgenstein once remarked, " 'We are quite sure of it' does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education" (Wittgenstein, *OC*, § 298). Each person has his own belief system, on the basis of which various practices are developed. These practices are part of people's lives and the basis of their worldview (Wittgenstein, *RFGB*). As Wittgenstein aptly remarked, in order to recognise the truth of scientific conclusions, which can often contradict people's common ideas and interpretations based on them, we need education in addition to science. Education contributes to the formulation of such a system of values, which becomes the basis of our firm beliefs about the truth of some statements (knowledge) and rejection of other ones as untrue, unscientific or unfounded.

Conclusions

The study of Wittgenstein's legacy in philosophy of education shows that the ideas of logical and linguistic analysis have acquired a clear pragmatic dimension. Therefore, Wittgenstein's philosophico-pedagogical theory goes beyond the analytic philosophy of education in its traditional sense (Watt, 1989; Smeyers & Marshall, 1995). It should be considered more broadly – as a synthesis of ideas of language analysis and pragmatism. This pragmatism is clearly manifested in his theoretical and practical developments in education, in his methodological approach to the learning process, in the interpretation of philosophical principles of communication and in determining the purpose and results of learning. Wittgenstein not only as an analytic thinker studied

individual cases of a particular issue, tried to be as precise as possible in the definition and investigated the linguistic means of expressing our intentions and opinions, he was very interested in such pragmatic topics as fixation of beliefs, conflict resolution in communication, the socio-cultural specifics of the learning process, the correlation of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic elements of speech, and so on. It can be argued that Wittgenstein not only developed certain ideas of pragmatists, but also significantly influenced the formation of a pragmatic approach in the philosophy of education. This state of affairs makes his philosophic-pedagogical conception still interesting not only for researchers but also for theorists and practitioners in philosophy and education.

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