THE DISCOURSE OF DAILY LIFE DURING THE WAR: THE 2022 UKRAINIAN PROJECTION

LARYSA KLYMANSKA
Department of Sociology and Social Work
Lviv Polytechnic National University
vul. Konovaltsia 4 Lviv, Ukraine
Email address: larysa_kl@ukr.net
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3693-7503

MARYNA KLIAMNSKA
Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Psychology
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv
vul. Universytetska 1 Lviv, Ukraine
E-mail address: marina.klimanska@gmail.com
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3047-2346

INNA HALETSKA
Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Psychology
Ivan Franko National University of Lviv
vul. Universytetska 1 Lviv, Ukraine
E-mail address: innahaletska@gmail.com
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9319-2229

ABSTRACT

Aim. To define and describe the positions of Ukrainians in their attitude to the war with Russia and reflection of this attitude in the discourse of daily life in wartime.

Methods. 25 transcripts of semi-structured interviews subjected to thematic analysis. Relying on the categories identified through thematic analysis, the criteria differentiating the attitude of Ukrainians to the war, viz. personalisation/depersonalisation, media practice of content consumption, assessment of the we-they-relationship, reflection on the changes in daily life, the process of adaptation to changes, ideas of exemplary behaviour were established.

Results. The analysis of the results enabled us to outline the problematic field of assessment of the attitude of Ukrainians to the full-scale war with Russia and reflection of this attitude in the discourse of daily life in wartime. Relying on the criteria differentiating this attitude, three typical positions were outlined – that of external observer, optimistic fatalist, and rational optimist.
**Originality.** The study was conducted in October-November 2022, on the ninth month of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it reflects the thoughts of Ukrainian civilians concerning the war and the process of adaptation to this complex situation. The use of quality methods (semi-structured interview) for the study ensured focusing on subjective peculiarities of the perception of war and daily life during in wartime.

**Conclusions.** The typology of ideas, types of attitudes of Ukrainians to the reality of war requires verification and further specification within a quantitative study aimed at clarification of quantitative figures representing the prevalence of the established positions.

**Key words:** Russian-Ukrainian war, daily life in the wartime, qualitative research methods, war discourse, position of an outside observer, position of an optimistic fatalist, position of a rational optimist.

**PROBLEM STATEMENT**

Understanding of the social and political situation in Ukraine under martial law resulting from the full-scale Russian invasion requires analysis of the transformation of people’s lives in the new extreme reality. These considerations lead us to the realisation of the importance of research into daily life. Societal development, in fact, is the daily life of humans in the historical dimension, that reflects certain constant properties and qualities whenever new life conditions appear and persist. It is analysis of daily life and its transformation that is the key to finding a clue to human capacity to survive and preserve human dignity in the extreme conditions of war, revolutions, terror, famine, as well as to adjust to extremely complicated life circumstances.

War changes the world of daily life. Social adaptation needs, the sense of isolation, helplessness characteristic of the war-affected people (Singh et al., 2021; Johnson et al., 2022) require reconsideration and integration into one’s own picture of the world. The overwhelming majority of people never thought about the probability of real war since they considered such a scenario unrealistic in the epoch of civilisation and rule of law, democracy and dignity (Mărcău et al., 2022). This reinforces the extremity of gaining the new experience of adapting to life in the new reality. Experiencing of the threat of war in Ukraine caused a rise in anxiety, depression, despair, uncertainty, and reduced level of psychological wellbeing even in safe countries of Europe (Brągiel & Gambin, 2022; Hajek et al., 2022; Mărcău et al., 2022; Skwirczyńska et al., 2022). And in Ukraine the lives of tens of millions of people changed drastically after the full-scale Russian invasion of February 24, 2022. Analysis of the daily life of a specific individual under state of war constitutes an illustration of the life of the society of a specific country in the historical situation of the war of 2022.

Through the prism of the conceptual system of Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological sociology, everyday life is understood extremely broadly. Not so much as the actual situation in the daily life of cities, towns and villages, as the feelings of residents, their subjective ideas about themselves, the world
and the events happening around them. Not so much as social reality but rather as the attitude to it, its forms in people’s conscience. Daily life as a special code arises in the conscience of individuals where it becomes necessary to solve a certain problem. In the focus of analysis are explanations of one’s own conduct, freedom of action, communication with people around you. The main task of daily life is adaptation and solving of daily-life problems that appear in the life of an ordinary individual (Schutz & Luckman, 2004).

Daily life is implemented in the spatial and time dimensions and is a temporal and topological experience. The core functions of daily life are preservation, survival, reproduction of an individual, society, culture. Daily life is perceived as life and activity of an individual in ordinary life situations on the basis of self-evident expectations, typification and intersubject communication. An individual has a personal complex of knowledge at a certain moment of daily life that serves as the scheme of interpretation of his past and present experience as well as predetermining prediction of future events by him (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Schutz & Luckman, 2004). This complex of knowledge is typified and creates the continuum of daily life, while the reality of daily life supports itself through its implementation in routine life (Berger & Luckmann, 1966).

Routine elements build up the background of daily life, the context where the drama of human life is staged. To be effective, background practices must be “consistent”. The background practices shape the living space of individuals, their environment. For an individual, the background practices of life space are the familiar world where everything that happens fits into an acceptable, predictable ordinary scheme. The cognitive basis for the routine of daily life is made up by schemes, scenarios, and frames via which an individual explains what is happening around him.

In the case of an unordinary event that does not fit into the field of expected results, that differs from the cognitive foundation of the ready-made schemes, scenarios and frames, the nature of the routine is interrupted, the background of daily interactions “gets a hole”, and enclaves of atypical and problematic experience are created in it. This makes the actor realise the mechanics of a routine that is not realised in ordinary conditions, and activates the process of creation of new schemes, scenarios, and frames used to explain this unexpected event. Gradually, the background practices of “patching” of holes caused by unexpected events make routine the unknown translating it into the known and familiar. In that way the continuity of daily life is restored. As the result of large-scale events, however, it becomes more difficult to fill in the lacunas with the fabric of routine actions.

Each war has its own social history, the sufferings appear and are settled in the social context developed through the senses and understanding of the events, and the divergence of the war experience lies in those senses (Summerfield, 1999). From the sociological point of view, war stands for the
collapse of the ordinary social order, violation of routine practices based on the old cognitive foundation. Some time has to pass for the new social order that includes knowledge “enriched” by war to get crystallised.

Daily life undergoes drastic, very rapid, sometimes even instantaneous transformations. Well-known rules stop functioning, confidence about their efficiency and relevance is transformed into uncertainty and disorganisation, the known world is immediately transformed into an unknown one. Such drastic transitions are very painful for people – their ordinary prosperous world collapses into ruins. Such transitions show the process of development of new frames of understanding and explanations of daily life.

Bernhard Waldenfels’ phenomenological school stresses that the notion of daily life is a conditional structure that appears the moment the fields of social life are delineated. The processes of transformation into daily life (Veralltaglichung) are opposed by the processes of overcoming of daily life (Entalltaglichung). Daily life separates one phenomenon from the other (Waldenfels, 1991). Analysing the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Waldenfelds stresses the global nature of the scope of its consequences, the conceptual ground for which is provided for by the phenomenology founded on pathos and responsivity which mainly stems not from what we say and do, but from what affects us all together (widerfährt), all of a sudden or on an ongoing basis (Waldenfels, 2022).

It is possible to understand daily life and its transformations on the basis of analysis of daily life discourse. Mastering of the world occurs via immersion into the real world, via discourse projections in experience, contemplations, assessment, or actions. The language typifies experience and concerns, determines the opportunity of uninterrupted objectivation of experience and thoughts on different aspects of the reality of social environment. Language predetermines the required ways of understanding and sets the procedure where it makes sense for the members of the society and where it filters the conscience at the entry and exit point (Cicourel, 1972).

New frames of understanding and explanation of daily life are born in the discursive projection of daily life. The discourse of peaceful life for Ukrainians gets transformed into the discourse of daily life of the wartime. Analysis of the discourse of daily life enables to identify the processes of development of new senses. Creation of the semantic space of the Russian-Ukrainian war is reflected in the appearance of new terms describing the reality of war for the sake of ordering senses, terms, names, events, symbols through which this war may be interpreted by the Ukrainian society (Vasiutynskyi et al., 2022). Creation of new lexical units in the military discourse that appeared due to new reality of life constitutes a sort of mirror reflection of the events and new daily life (Har, 2022). Analysis of the discourse of posts in social media and comments on them has identified the dynamics of changes in the coping strategy over the first weeks of the war: from non-adaptive emotion-focused coping strategies through problem-
focused to the coping strategies of positive emotional mood creation, hedonistic wishes and co-empathy (Khraban, 2022).

The goal of the study is to identify the discourse of daily life of the wartime via description of the positions of Ukrainians in their attitude to the war with Russia.

**RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

The attitude of Ukrainians to the war with Russia resulting from full-scale Russian invasion and reflection of this attitude in the discourses of the daily life of wartime was studied using the method of semi-structured interview with open questions. Assistance in the interviews was provided by the students of the Department of Social Science and Social Work, Lviv Polytechnic National University and students of the Department of Psychology, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. The data was collected during the ninth month of the war, over October-November 2022 in Ukraine. The transcripts of semi-structured interviews subjected to thematic analysis constituted the empirical base for the research.

The interviews were held after the respondents gave their informed consent. The questions of the semi-structured interview were related to the main research problems. Information was transferred from audio carriers into transcripts that were further encoded and analyzed manually.

All the questions were obligatory. The survey was completed by 25 persons aged from 18 to 75 (15 men and 10 women, residents of different cities, towns and villages of Ukraine) in the interviews held face-to-face or on ZOOM platform.

While analysing the texts of semi-structured interviews the thematic analysis was used – as a qualitative data analysis method that presupposes systemic breakdown and grouping of the information obtained in the course of the qualitative study via merger of depersonalised judgments and quotations with the help of the respective code that contributes to the identification of relevant topics (Braun & Clarke, 2006; 2014; 2019).

Analysis of transcripts included a step-by-step coding process. At the stage of structural coding the chief analyst encoded textual elements in each transcript of the semi-structured interviews in the way that corresponded to the ways in which informants were assessing the daily life of the wartime, explained it, and selected adaptation strategies for themselves.

The second wave of analysis was arranged via creation of the thematic structure for data classification and arrangement by the key topics, concepts, and new categories. The thematic structure consisted of a series of core topics divided according to the consistency of related subtopics. They were developed and improved due to the familiarisation with unprocessed data until the moment of the completeness. Thus, on the basis of the results
of coding, three thematic databases were created, named “Assessment of war”, “Attitude to Russianness”, “Daily life of wartime”.

The third wave of analysis was arranged through an immersion/crystallisation method (Borkan, 1999), that is the process that includes deep immersion into the core parts of the encoded data – with regular deviation from them for the sake of reflection and reaching the level of position typology. All the authors considered the results of such coding analysis. Settlement of divergences was achieved via discussion. Transcripts of 25 interviews available in the authors’ archive are used for citation in the text of the article. The description of informants is proposed in Appendix A.

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

On the basis of the categories identified within the thematic analysis the criteria were identified for differentiating the attitude of Ukrainians to war: personification/depersonification, media practice of content consumption, assessment of we-they-relationship; reflection on the changes in the field of daily life, adaptation to changes, ideas on normative behaviour in wartime.

Personification/Depersonification of War

The primary essence of personification is a characteristic of conscience to ascribe human properties to notions, objects, phenomena of the surrounding world. In sociology the principle of personification is applied for explaining social issues. In each personification case a leader is outlined, and he is responsible for those events, that is he becomes the cause of all the events for which he is responsible. Respectively, depersonification does not presuppose embodiment of these or other social phenomena in a specific person, leader, this is depersonification, deprivation of this or that phenomenon of the right to be the embodiment of actions of a single individual, even an outstanding one. In our study, personification looks as ascribing the causes of the war to one person – President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, while depersonification presupposes that the origin of the war lies at a much deeper level than just ambitions of a political leader, they are rooted in the history of relations of the two countries. Combination of personification and depersonification in the informant’s answer about the causes of the war testify to the explanation of the causes through interaction of historical and mental predispositions and appearance of the person who is striving to help solve his narcissistic and political problems via the “special operation” (after launching a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Putin called it a “special military operation” manipulatively avoiding calling it a war. As of January 2023, the ban on the use of the word “war” continues to exist in Russia. In Ukraine, the term “special operation” is used to emphasize the manipulative falsehood of Russian propaganda).
**Media Practice of Content Consumption**

Media practices are customary stereotypified ways of interaction of entities with media sources that shape the media environment for existence of individuals. Media practices include interaction with information resources via search of, perception, interpretation of information, differentiation of authentic and fake information, information exchange and use. Our informants showed three types of media practices: naïve trust, information skepticism, reflexive trust (Klymanska & Lutsychyn, 2022).

**Assessment We-They-Relationship**

The basic foundation of daily life is created by the so called “typification” in relation to interpretation of the social world events, and, at the same time, the ideas about other actors, event participants. Typification of the Other is an integral part of the social interaction process, in particular, such an extreme process as war. Meetings with others in daily life are typified in the double dimensions – first, Other is perceived as a pre-determined type, secondly, interaction with it is perceived as typical for specific circumstances as such.

Several questions were dedicated to the clarification of the image of Other and attitude to it (Russians in this case): about collective responsibility; the image of a Ukrainian in the minds of modern Russians; acceptability of the use of the Russian language (since it is protection of Russian-speaking individuals that was officially expressed as one of the core reasons in the so called “special operation” on the part of Russia). The informants mainly demonstrated unambiguous attitude to Russians and all Russian, the difference of the representatives of definite positions lies in the declarative nature or the striving to argument the position and in the presented arguments.

**Reflection on the Changes in the Field of Daily Life, the Process of Adaptation to Changes, Ideas on Exemplary Behaviour in Wartime**

Reflection on changes and adaptation on them envisaged questions on the changes themselves, the level of changes (global – it’s about Ukraine or the whole world, or personal – the informant speaks about changes in his own world), where the changes can be seen (in external manifestations – decisions of the authorities, restrictions in daily life, or inside the individual). Most informants notified about the appearance of the sense of life fragility. Depending on the perception of changes, the informants commented upon the strategies of adaptation to daily life in wartime. Coping strategies are rather clearly divided into passive strategy and active strategy of action, hence, the ideas about exemplary conduct were differentiated by the principle “not to act” (not to panic, not to create any extra stress, not to be alarmed) and “to act” (to donate, to volunteer, to make camouflage nets, etc.). Combination of those criteria results in the determination of three positions in the attitude of Ukrainians to the war (Table 1).
### Table 1
*The review of positions and war discourses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of positions/ Specification</th>
<th>Outside observer</th>
<th>Optimistic fatalist</th>
<th>Rational optimist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topic: War assessment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personification/ Depersonification of war</td>
<td>War is a depersonified event</td>
<td>War is a depersonified event (this has already happened) with some elements of personification</td>
<td>War is a personified event, a choice made by a specific person in the conditions determined by historical circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of war</td>
<td>External forces / circumstances</td>
<td>Historical objectivism, historical inevitability with some elements of personification</td>
<td>War is the result of multiple factors (of subjective and objective nature)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Topic: Media practices of content consumption | | | |
| Sources of knowledge about the situation | | | |
| − Traditional media, − Sources of secondary information (commentators) | News, − Social media, Ukrainian and foreign intellectuals, − Own analytical thinking | − YouTube channels, Telegram channels, − Backbones of democratic, independent press, − Official channels, acquaintances, including servicemen |
| Assessment of information reliability | Reluctance or impossibility to pass a decision on the reliability or unreliability of the information consumed | − The search of the required information in the form of facts, and not comments, − Verification of information reliability | − Assessment of information reliability in case this is possible, − Differentiated attitude to different types of information and its reliability |
| Attitude to Russian information channels | Lack of trust both in the information, and in the source | Consumption of information from Russian sources following the principle “it is inadequate to have one optic” | Consumption of information from Russian sources with orientation not just at the fact-based component, but at the emotional background of information presentation as well |

<p>| Media practice | Naïve trust | Information skepticism | Reflexive trust |
| Media practice | | | |
| <strong>Topic: Assessment of we-they-relationship</strong> | | | |
| Collective responsibility of Russians | Declarative position – absolutely all Russians must be responsible | On the one hand, there is no collective responsibility in general, as the Russian nation does not exist, but, on the other hand, they bear responsibility as voters who have elected such a president and such authorities | Well-grounded position – absolutely all Russians must be responsible |</p>
<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Image of Ukrainian with the eyes of Russians</td>
<td>Stereotypically negative views of Russians reproduced</td>
<td>Younger brother’s optics</td>
<td>– Russians treat Ukrainians the way they are told to; – Derogatory attitude to Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fate of the Russian language</td>
<td>Russian language should disappear</td>
<td>Well-grounded categorically to the need for the Ukrainian language to prevail and the fate of the Russian language in Ukraine, but doubts concerning whether it is possible “here and now” just to ban Russian</td>
<td>– Russian language is one of the causes of the ongoing war – Everything related to state must be only in Ukrainian; – Russian language may remain in families, on the daily life level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Topic: “Assessment of changes”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in daily life</th>
<th>Changes focus on the level of external circumstances</th>
<th>Life is split into “pre-war” and “post-war”; Most of the changes are in the value dimension; Military hedonism</th>
<th>Changes focus on the global and personal level Military hedonism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation to changes</td>
<td>One can get accustomed to everything</td>
<td>Passive coping strategies</td>
<td>Active coping strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemplary conduct in the daily life at wartime</td>
<td>– To be of maximum use in one’s place – A person should live, work and hope for the better</td>
<td>– Not to create more stress; – Not to panic, not to do spread the fake</td>
<td>– To help with whatever possible, – Not to stay inactive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Discourse of the daily life during wartime | Formalised adaptation discourse | “Encapsulated” present discourse | Active present discourse |

**Source.** Own research

**Outside Observer’s Position (Transcripts 1, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16)**
Outside observer’s position presupposes that a person looks at the situation from aside, provides impartial assessment, though acknowledging oneself as a part of this situation. Such outside observer’s position may appear as the result of different reasons: staying abroad (7 - informant’s number in Appendix A); mature age – “I don’t have any fear since I am already sev-
enty-five [hereinafter citations are provided as they were worded by the informants]” (1); unwillingness to recognise oneself as being inside in the crisis situation (3 – the interview was held in the time of air raid in the bomb shelter).

The representatives of such position normally have a depersonified idea of war and its determinants. The causes of the war, according to them, are external forces, while nobody is personally responsible for the outbreak of the war. The following are ascribed responsibility for the war: abstract power in general – “consciously or subconsciously the authorities were giving signals to Russia that we can be appropriated” (3), or an abstract political regime “…this happened due to a destructive regime in the neighbouring country …due to the striving to appropriate our history, the history of our nation” (16), or, “the country”, to put it in abstract terms - “The invasion of our country by the other country, …our current authorities did not make any concessions to Russia the way they had been doing before” (7), or evade calling specific subject who, in fact, started the war, using stereotypical names of social types – “Muscovite(moskal) [a common informal household term for Russians; has a neutral or slightly dismissive attitude]”, or, derogitavely, “Lilliputian” (11). Depersonalisation is manifested in the use of pronouns “we”, “they”, collocations “those people”, “people en masse”, verbs in passive voice “were not driven away”, this distancing the informant from the events and processes he describes.

A typical media practice of content consumption of an outside observer is naïve trust (Klymanska & Lutsynchyn, 2022): superficial perception of information, unwillingness or impossibility to pass decisions on the reliability or fake nature of information. Representatives of this position address the sources of secondary information, that is information with ready-made comments made by political and military experts (3), popular bloggers (16). As far as consumption of Russian content is concerned, the representatives of this position show declarative, ungrounded lack of trust both in the information, and its sources: “no to Russian sources, they all lie” (1), addressing Russian channels “no, never ever!” (9), “…Russian sources all keep lying” (11).

The position of an outside observer enables an individual not to express own opinions and not to manifest own feelings. In our research optics this position appears just as the informant’s reluctance to express the opinion due to lack of trust in the interviewer, or lack of capacity to describe the whole spectrum of thoughts and emotions in relation to the matter. In particular, the outside observer’s position is manifested in the purely declarative repetition of stereotypical statements on the responsibility of all Russians for the war:

“…since they don’t do anything to stop the war … Even if their children, their husbands, sons are taken to the war, they keep just sitting and crying. Doing absolutely NOTHING [capital letters in quotes from transcripts indicate words on which the informant emphasized]. That is why they ALL should be responsible” (9).
“...I think that all residents of Russia are guilty of the war since they have joined it in this or that way” (16). The way of involvement is explained through standard clichés – starting with “...since they are... all Muscovites” (11), “this ... is done for their money, even if they are against the war, they keep silent, that is also engagement. This means that they all are to blame. Certainly, there are those who are more to blame, but everyone bears general responsibility” (16).

The opposition we-they concerning perception of Ukrainians by Russians is reflected in stereotypical statements. “Russians hate Ukrainians and have always hated them, have been humiliating them all the time” (10), “we are not humans in their perception at all!” (7), this can be done via propaganda (7), specific mindset Russians get in their childhood (7).

The teasing question on the fate of the Russian language is settled by the representatives of this position in a simple and unambiguous way: Russian language should disappear (1; 10), its role in the post-war world must be brought to zero (7), “Russian language must disappear. Not just in Ukraine, but everywhere. Absolutely everywhere. Let it exist only in that awful swamp (Russia)” (9). Some of the above arguments often refer to emotional “arguments” – “I hate them and their language. Since they say “shto” and “kak” (1), “Since Russian appeared as the result of the fact that some Mongolian tribes wanted to learn Ukrainian, but they certainly failed to” (16), “how can one speak the language of those who have come to kill you?” (9).

The outside observer’s position does not presuppose any reflection on the changes in own life, that is why the informants mainly indicated that “...I don’t know, nothing seems to have changed” (7), “To tell the truth, nothing has changed in my understanding” (9). The person focuses on the maximum changes at the level of external circumstances – “Alarms, each day alarms” (11).

As strategies and tactics of adaptation to changes, outside observers indicate “one can get used to anything” (9), “I just live ... no other option” (10), “To adapt. I don’t know how” (7), “One should learn to pull oneself together in tough situations. And you can always cry later” (3). Finally, the informants also give the answer to the question about the exemplary behaviour model during the war either focusing on external behaviour manifestations – “…there is a curfew, so she should stay at home. Why go outdoors” (11), “And I want flowers to grow, to think less about war” (1), or with TV clichés – “Exemplary behaviour of individuals means that you are most useful in your place ...that is a person must be kind, must work for the country’s economy, sell shoes, repair pipelines, cure people – anyway, he or she should be kind and honest in his or her place” (16), “People must just help the Ukrainian army with donations and support the country’s economy” (9), “A person should live, work, and hope for the better. And believe. The war is going on, but life is also going on” (10).

The outside observer’s position is characterised by the use of formalised adaptation discourse. Distancing from the daily reality of the wartime in the discourse is developed via specific depersonalised vocabulary, reproduc-
tion of stereotypes in the perception of the military conflict by the other party, categoric and declarative nature of statements that obstructs some opportunities.

Optimistic Fatalist’s Position (Transcripts – 2, 4, 5, 8, 12, 22)

Optimistic fatalism comes to be the outcome of the uniqueness of the situation Ukraine has got into. This situation that paradoxically combines the past (the striving to finally reject colonial dependence on Russia) and the future (unconditional faith in victory) creates the discourse of optimistic fatalism. The guidance “Tomorrow is something nobody has been promised” is perceived by Ukrainians as a mantra of daily life and implemented as the daily practice of today. And this is the reflection of the fatalism of this position. Absence of hesitations about the future causes the second part of this position – optimism. A fatalist believes in the inevitability of events and fate. He keeps to the position “it was to be like this” or, in some changed form, “this has already happened” and considers that he can have only a minor impact on what is happening.

Concerning the essence of the war, the representatives of this position adhere to the so called “historical objectivism” with admixtures of personification. A fatalist is of the opinion that everything is settled in advance, while the events analysed are not accidental.

On the one hand, war is the result of historical encroachments of Russia, imperialistic nature of this state – “Russia still continues to be ... an empire... This is an anti-colonial war. This empire tries to win back its colony” (5), “Well, sooner or later this would have happened since Russia wants to conquer our lands” (12), this is the continuation of one-hundred-year aggression (5). As the reasons for such colonial aggression, the following are mentioned: “the myth of Kyiv” - “Kyiv is in their history as a great myth, they cannot do without it. They don’t have any single window to Europe without us ...” (5). This situation is beyond the control of any specific individual. “What is happening is happening above me” (2).

But, on the other hand, the understanding of personal responsibility for what has happened is articulated – “…Nobody knows what is happening there, but for the people who really play chess” (2), this “Putin seems to be sick with the disease of majesty of the Soviet Union ...” (4).

The representatives of this position have a wider source base than outside observers (news, social media, and analytical thinking ... Ukrainian and foreign intellectuals) (5). They follow the principles of information skepticism that includes trust in the information and possible lack of trust in the source of information (Klymanska, & Lutsychyn, 2022). In particular, informants expressed their skepticism about social media as the source of information, but they still mention social media in their list of sources.

A skeptical person is capable of seeing the weakness of any argument and strives to verify and get the confirmation for every single detail in the picture of the world. This type of media practice is characterised by the
targeted search of the required information in accordance with one’s own interests – “I am interested not in comments, but in facts: taken or not taken. I use Deep stay map. That is the website where you can see what is generally happening in the battlefield, I see what has been invaded, what has not, where their army is now, where our army is now, and that’s it” (2). This is the principle “it is inadequate to have one optic” (5), one should compare different points of view (8) and the principle of active interference into the very process of information provision – “it is interesting to follow what they write there. You can correct some of their ideas in the comments or in personal messages” (5). They also consume information from the Russian sources, accounting for this with their inquisitiveness (5) or entertainment purposes (22).

And the representatives of this position get the realisation of the fact that in Russia “no one is independent to really have a look at this war and somehow assess it” (5).

Optimistic fatalists formulate some fundamental statements on which they ground their attitude to collective responsibility of Russians: 1) there is no nation in general, as there is no joint responsibility as such: “there are people who are in favour, and there are people who are against, there are even Ukrainians who support the war and want Russia to invade them ... Russians are mostly living their lives and are not interested in what happens around them” (2); 2) “…collective, nation is what is required – the people united with a common idea, some common values that would lead them somewhere, to the future. They don’t feel this, though they should” (5). That is why “we can and must accuse them, but can we demand from them this feeling of joint responsibility?” (5); 3) denial of joint responsibility of Russians – “they (Russians) don’t have any choice. Well, they live in that country. They can go to the streets. Well, that is already their decision” (2), at the same time insistence on such responsibility – “The fact that now they don’t carry weapons in the east, or in the south of Ukraine, or that they do not press any buttons to launch missile strikes on our territories does not mean that they are not responsible for this. We are jointly responsible for every action taken by our state” (5). And in spite of the fact that they don’t have any choice, they “are responsible for the actions of the candidate selected by them to rule the country” (8).

One can summarise the answers concerning joint responsibility of Russians within this position with the assessment made by one of the informants – “If we assess it by the ten-point score, this is, most probably, joint responsibility by five out of 10” (2).

Assessment of the perception of Ukrainians by Russians among the representatives of this position is also ambiguous. In the opinion of informants, Russians treat Ukrainians either absolutely indifferently (2), or demonstrate the fascist-Bandera-Nazi attitude imposed by Russian propaganda (4). The young brother’s optics may well be perceived as the basis for such treatment of Ukrainians by Russians, as one of the informants has
aptly put it: they perceive us not as enemies, but rather as a sort of – “... the younger brother who has come from the village, speaks a good rural dialect, is totally unaware of the situation in the world, of the culture, and can only be some mechanical task performer” (5). If reality does not confirm such expectations of Russians, they get the feeling – “a colony cannot teach the empire” (5), “to look for a way to humiliate us again” (5), finally, to hold a “special operation” on

... taming of the younger brother, the desire to explain to him that he is living the wrong life, not looking in the right direction, not doing the right things, that the best choice for him would be to stay in the family, to take him back. (5)

In their attitude to the Russian language the representatives of this position show well-grounded categoric attitude: in some “perfect world of utopia” (5) it would be good if “Ukraine had only its own language and if most of its residents spoke Ukrainian” (2), “I would like this language to remain behind closed doors” (5). This wish, along with that, may transform into a more rigid form of. Wishes concerning the fate of the Russian language are also unambiguous – “the fate of the Russian language must be somewhere in Russia” (4).

On the other hand, the following doubt is expressed: “in fact, it is impossible to eradicate the Russian language in the Ukrainian territories” (2); in spite of the fact that Russian is not an international language, it is locally used as an interstate language, it existed as such over the 70 years of the former USSR (the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), The Soviet Union - communist state, nominally a federal union of fifteen national republics; Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union until 1991, after which most of the union republics became independent states. The USSR is used as a symbol of the undemocratic communist regime). That is why, in spite of the wish to make Ukrainian the only language in the Ukrainian territory “here and now”, one cannot just ban the Russian language. “That will be exactly what was once done to us when the Ukrainian language was banned. It would be advisable to make it grow at the level of some civic conscience into the situation when it is shameful to speak this language. And that is the sign showing that this path of Ukrainisation has not been covered, let’s put it that way. The sign of own lack of development in some conscious direction” (5). Transformation of the Ukrainian language into the prevailing one may be implemented as a spontaneous process – “now in the situation of the war, I think, Ukrainians will stop using Russian” (2), or using the following civilization procedure – “exams for getting Ukrainian citizenship, viz. in the history of Ukraine and in the Ukrainian language” (4), finally, due to differentiated attitude to those who are practic-

If you switch to Ukrainian, but you still don’t manage to do it quite well – then fine, no problem, you are great. If you keep consciously communicating in Russian, consume the Russian content and don’t see any problem about that – well, dear, there will be problems between you and us. (22)
The optimistic fatalist’s position presupposes a reflection on the changes in the surrounding social world. Life has been divided into before and after: before—ordinary life, after—war life. And the realisation of what will come after, the post-war life—and in it:

when we win the war will not disappear for us. It will always remain in our minds since memories will never disappear. I will never be able to buy a penthouse now. I will never be buying fireworks and will not be reading Orwell, since there are too many similar memories. And when I have my own building, I will buy a generator and a water container there. I don’t want it to be used any day, but they are not going to make things worse anyway. (22)

Changes can be traced both at the level of external manifestations (air alarms, curfew) (2), and at the level of perception of life itself (5), and at the level of enhancement of emotions (8), and higher anxiety (22). The most significant changes, in the opinion of the representatives of this position are changes in the value field of human life—“a person starts reconsidering his actions, values and the general vector along which he is moving in this life” (8). And not just existential values (life, security, etc.) are meant here, but the values of “interpersonal relationship between people, that is friendship, family” (8), psychological health (22). Interesting and unexpected have turned out to be the references to the values (and this, in our opinion, determines the optimism in its fatality) of freedom—“own values of people have become illuminated, which means that we have reassessed the fact which is often not understood abroad—that we put our own freedom above people’s lives … First comes freedom, and then—everything else” (5), and the value of Other in its difference from oneself. “I tend to better understand psychological traumas and the importance of psychological health. I feel scared when I just imagine how many broken people’s lives we will have, and they still have to live in this world” (22).

A common denominator in the changes happening in the life of ordinary people in the times of the war appears to be a sort of “war hedonism”—“In fact, I feel as if we were living one day only. That is why I try to get the maximum of emotions, feelings” (4), or, as one of our informants said by rephrasing Lina Kostenko’s, famous Ukrainian poet and writer, words “One should live with today, not waiting for the date dreamt of, burn with today’s fire since tomorrow may not come. That is absolutely realistic” (12).

In case changes are pointed out, individuals need to adapt to them. This position of optimistic fatalism presupposes in the part of fatalism that nothing can be done about what it happening. Adaptation strategies include, as thought by fatal optimists: preliminary preparation “…and I was preparing myself to the war and the army since childhood since I wanted to deal with that” (4), “presence of a great number of people, getting united with close people” (5), programmed rituality:
I don’t go to work, but I live in the same place, I live in my apartment. I walk along the same roads. The striving to find something of my own in all this and something similar to my previous life as well as to establish new rituality. (5)

These coping strategies may be referred to the category of passive ones since they do not presuppose any activity-based approach. In their majority, the representatives of the optimistic fatalism position declare non-activity approach while adapting to changes – to sleep with the thought about the worst possible changes, to stay among other people, to repeat already functioning rituals, to just rely on the effect of mental safeguards (8), to rely on the algorithm of actions suggested by someone – “it is bad to get accustomed to the war, but now I don’t turn grey whenever I just hear the alarm signal – there is a clear and cold-minded realisation of the action algorithm” (22). And that, in fact, reflects the principles of such optimistic fatalism – why act if everything is going to be fine anyway. “In fact, this war... I imagine it as a phoenix since the old body is burnt and a new one appears from ashes – a stronger, a more beautiful one. The same is true about Ukraine” (4).

Hence, exemplary behaviour in the situation of war-related changes for the representatives of this position is considered to be as follows: “…not to create more stress” (22), “cold mind, the ability to soberly assess the situation, not to panic, not to fall victim to mass concern” (8), or to generally deny availability of such exemplary behaviour model (5).

The use of verbs with particle “not” – “not to do …”, “not to panic!” (4), in fact, denotes omission of action within the outlined position.

Thus, the optimistic fatalist’s position is marked via the encapsulated present discourse. This discourse of the daily life of war reality mainly marks war as a depersonified event in which a political leader implemented in his political strategies what was “enshrined in history”. The interference of a “small person” is not envisaged, this person denies his own importance, he is indifferent about his enemy, he feels the “course of history”, fully agrees with it, passively adapts, “encapsulates” his present day, shows omission of action in the attitude to changes. Encapsulated present is the metaphor that has been repeated in numerous variations by most of our informants representing this position – “Even if we don’t see this, even it is seems to us that we do the planning, that we tend to live the way we used to live before, our life is still encapsulated into one day that we try to live, and we live the next one regardless of whether we live in Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, or somewhere closer to the east of Ukraine” (5).

**Rational Optimist’s Position (Transcripts – 6, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25)**

Optimism, however, can also be rational (Ridley, 2010) as a combination of the realistic assessment of the present day with the preservation of faith in the possibility of better reality. Faith in the better is necessary not to ignore
problems, but to be ready to overcome them. Human progress is linear for rational optimists – the situation may keep improving all the time, but on the condition that effort is taken by people.

The war launched by the RF in the Ukrainian territory cannot be considered inevitable. War is definitely evil – “war cannot be justified by anything. War is not a way out!” (6). A developed civilised society “has got a sufficient number of levers of influence, sanction methods that may resolve the core conflicts … with no application of weapons” (24). War is about choice, and every side has made it:

They had the choice to make – not to start this war. We had just one choice: either to yield to their barbarity, or to rebuff them, to protect ourselves as any human who cares about himself would do, or as any nation taking care of itself would do. The only thing that can be justified here, and I will be justifying those who are defending themselves – these are the right steps, this is a sound decision of adult people taking care of themselves, of their children. That means taking care of themselves, protecting themselves, rebuffing this attack of the enemy. (17)

The war has resulted from the effect of multiple factors of objective and subjective nature. Objective, that is historically stipulated once, include conflicts between Ukraine and Russia as a certain natural factor, “historical inevitability” – back from the times of the Kyivan Rus. And during the twenty-first century there have been many moments in the history of the already independent Ukraine that directly showed us that the conflict was inevitable” (23), “it all started very long ago, in the times of the Kyivan Rus, Catherine. Russians do not see us as separate people, a separate nation …” (19). An objective factor that was transformed into the cause of the military conflict was the desire of our enemies “to get our deposits, our minerals, our values” (15).

The informants perceive Russia itself as the greatest problem of this war, since people made their choice there to “allow to deceive them with this propaganda, to allow to yield, to go down to the level where something human is probably lost and where barbarity starts” (17). The differences in the mentality of the Ukrainian and Russian nations, in the opinion of our informants, have led to the paradoxical situation in the minds of the Russian leaders – the colony came to live better than the metropolis: “we came to live better. And to live better not just in the centres like Moscow, Saint-Petersburg, or in some other large regional centres. We came to live better even in mountainous villages. Since the mentality of Ukrainians says that when they earn money they should first invest into their estate, build a house, arrange the territory, the land, and so on, and only then to go to have some rest somewhere unlike Muscovites. They have a different approach. If they earn money – they thrift it, earn again – and thrift it again, they are not looking into the future, unlike us” (14).
This mentality of Russians is imposed in an interesting way on the personality of their leader and his ambitions (18). Personal ambitions are reinforced by the desire “to raise his rating via the war” (24).

The difference in the perception of the nature and the causes of the war among the representatives of this position from the two previous ones lies in the fact that war is considered to be an event in which, to a different extent, both parties have been involved: on the part of Russians these are imperial ambitions, while on the part of Ukrainians – “allowing to oppress ourselves” (6), “…we have been lacking national conscience heavily” (13) and the unpreparedness for the full-scale RF’s invasion - “…I think that many people did not believe that much that this war is possible in the twenty-first century” (18).

One more point that adds understanding to the position of rational optimism is the ability to see not just negative things in this position, but to try and find positive sides of this war situation. The enemy has united the Ukrainian nation – war has led to significant changes in people’s behaviour and thoughts:

People started praying more, going to church. And then came the changes… but the impetus for this was given by the war …for Ukraine to become a friendlier state. For the people in the south and in the east to understand what Russia is like. …That is the advantage that people have come to understand who their enemy is … (18)

The media practice of content consumption among the representatives of this position is based on critical thinking. This type can be called reflexive trust (Klymanska & Lutsychyn, 2022) that denotes the media practice that includes distrust in information and trust in the source of information – “…I use the sources where information is verified, reasonable, well-balanced” (17). It is important for those people to quickly get notifications (23), to follow the changes in the country and “to be aware of the events” (18).

The sources of information consumption include YouTube channels (6), acquaintances, including servicemen (13), core backbones of democratic independent press located in the Ukrainian territory (23), Telegram channels (15), official channels of the President of Ukraine, Lviv Regional Military Administration (15).

These people get a clear realisation of the possible incorrectness of the information provided: “how will you check!? No way. You will need to go there and see, and who will go? They can tell whatever they want. Even that the empire from the Star Wars and reptilians are attacking us” (13), understanding that not all information, for different reasons, may be provided (14), differentiated treatment of different types of information that perform different functions (19).

The representatives of this position also ask the question about certain limitations in information consumption:
I have come to realise that it is high time that I filtered the information, not just from the point of view of information hygiene, but in the sense that there are very many different sources bringing in many contradictions and stresses. (17)

But, in spite of information hygiene, most of them consume information from Russian sources, focusing not just on its untruthfulness in a differentiated way (everybody keeps lying there), but also following some emotional responses to these or other events – “I take into account (Russian sources). I have come to recently like Vladimir Solovyov’s, Russian TV presenter and propagandist, talk show since you can see by his emotions where we are winning” (14). There is understanding of the fact that information from Russian sources should not be used as some objective information, but it is often considered to be important purely for professional or scientific reasons, to study propaganda or to create counter-propaganda (17).

In the we-they opposition the representatives of this position rather unambiguously point to joint responsibility of all Russians. And that is not about declarative statements, that is a well-grounded position. The statement “It is their absolute responsibility” (6) appears at the end of the text that is fully dedicated to the substantiation of such statement. Argumentation of the statement on joint responsibility of Russians is multiple. First of all, that is the mention about the support of the political regime of the current Russian leader – “it is not the president who has elected a country, but the country that has elected its president” (17), “they have been supporting this regime for twenty years. They keep voting for Putin, he bent the constitution to himself, they have all voted in favor, they have agreed to the deceitful election, to voting fraud …” (14). As a result, “these people have allowed to put them into the position of absolute slavery, have allowed to do with their country, with their lives whatever the ruling authorities want” (6).

Secondly, “not the president alone has launched this war. Moreover, neither Shoigu, not Putin have been to our territory. These are, respectively, the people who are the citizens of that aggressor state” (15). That was just at the beginning of the full-scale Russia’s aggression “…we all thought that this is only the war of Putin and his personal ambitions” (24).

Thirdly, omission of action on the part of Russians can also be called activity leading to joint responsibility – “…no rallies, no mass protests in the territory of Russia … have been held” (15), “they don’t protest, they keep silent” (17). The position of non-interference, silence in this case is also a crime. Those who keep silent “thus give permission to the war” (17). The myth about the so called “good Russians” is dispelled since even a declared position “yes, I am against the war”, first of all, does not mean that a person does something to stop it (17), and secondly this does not cancel the Russian perception of the “cultural, civilization narrative saying that there is a Russia, there is a Ukraine, there is a Belarus, they all have to be friends, and that is a united cultural space. This means that they are the people
who, probably, object to having any element of physical violence in a toxic family, but they favour the very existence of that toxic family” (17).

The ideas of most Russians about Ukrainians are negative – “most Russians have got an obsessive opinion of Ukrainians that we are a bad nation, that we hate them, and they automatically come to hate us” (25). And our informants indicate the “zombified” nature of the Russian population in this issue – “due to total distortion of information, lies people treat us badly” (6), “They treat us the way they are told. Now they treat us badly as enemies, Nazi, Bandera guys, fascists. They used to treat us as the brotherly people. They have treated everything the way they were told” (13).

And there is understanding of the fact that Russians may treat us differently. There are some who “support Ukraine, but they are just afraid of expressing their views” (18), “young people tend to perceive us more adequately than the older generation. The older generation have their minds stuck, and they still follow the criteria [in their minds] that Russia is liberating someone” (18).

The attitude of Russians to Ukrainians can be called “depreciating” – they perceive us as “such clumsy funny people who are generally good guys but only if they do not advocate their interests too much. These are just some “other Russians”, but generally they are ok if their level of national conscience does not go beyond wearing a parody, unauthentic embroidered shirt or singing folk songs after drinking fifty grams of vodka. …but their own opinion, right to identity is normally not recognised” (17). Depreciation of Ukrainians (“well, khokhly-khokhy [ethnofolism, a derogatory name for a Ukrainian, used in everyday life among Russians]” (19)) occurs in the background of artificial glorification of their own people of Russia.

The question about the fate of the Russian language in Ukraine and the world has been primarily discussed in the background of the mention that it is the Russian language that was indirectly mentioned as the reason for the Russian-Ukrainian war – according to official general Russian rhetoric, Russia is where there is the Russian language, and:

…this definitely is the tragedy of our state and our society in general. That people came to understand this only after many cities and towns had been destroyed, and many people had been tortured and perished. Then they understood what they should reject. Well, what else …well, Russians are protecting Russian-speaking people, were it not for the Russian-speaking residents there would be no one to protect. (19)

That is why there is also a position, and it looks absolutely logical, that the Russian language should be rejected in Ukraine (23).

Nevertheless, the language issue is acknowledged to be a complex one. No categorical recipes for 100% elimination of the Russian language are discussed by the representatives of rational optimism. They rather speak about being realistic in the treatment of this issue. While answering the question whether Ukrainians should stop using Russian, one of our infor-
mants gave a very cautious answer: “That would not be bad. Not “have to”, but “it would be nice” (13).

The process of transition to Ukrainian must be gradual since “nobody does anything under pressure” (13). We may accelerate transition to Ukrainian, Ukrainise a major part of the Russian-speaking residents in this respect via opening of schools with some social motivation. “If you attend this school and make some progress, the state will somehow make your life easier” (13). The fate of the Russian language should be like the fate of any foreign language, that is “it just exists, and, in fact, people who speak it should not be humiliated or condemned” (17).

The language issue has been considered by the representatives of the rational optimism position in two tiers. First, that is the language at the state level – “everything related to the state – only the Ukrainian language” (14). If we speak about services provision, languages of official websites, language of education, some information broadcast by public broadcast companies, that must definitely be only Ukrainian (17). Moreover, the requirement for getting Ukrainian citizenship would be to pass an exam in the Ukrainian language and the history of Ukraine, and that is normal for a normal civilised state.

The second level is that Russian is accepted as the language of communication:

… it may live in families. …there are people who have been speaking Russian all their lives, and they, probably, find it difficult to make this transition, to learn it … while all other things, when a person goes out, in the shops, in any institutions, in restaurants, at school, at university, everywhere, he should hear the Ukrainian language. (24)

The representatives of this position unambiguously point out the changes occurring in society and in the life of individuals, but they tend to speak more about the global changes – in the global order - from “I think that the world must change, and the world has seen what the new order should be like. For a country just not to have any right to do whatever it wants” (18) to the generalised understanding of the “fragility of life of individuals” (6); from the familiarisation of the world with Ukraine to the negative image of Russia as a partner:

I saw once again that “all agreements with Russia are just empty words, or paper and ink spent in vain. They lie at the top level, lie systemically, starting with why they launched the so called military operation, de-nationalisation, demilitarisation, and now even de-satanisation of Ukraine. (14)

As far as changes in private life are concerned, all informants spoke in different words about the fact that the life of every individual may change at the click of the button. “Everything may change DRASTICALLY at one point of time” (18)

we, in fact, live in the reality where you sort of know that theoretically there is a chance that you will never wake up again since you don’t know when a mis-
sile will come tomorrow, and whether they will pass, whether they come in a
month, or in how much time. (24)
And, as result, “military hedonism”:
I would say I did not live the present day so much before the war, while now I
live with the understanding of the fact that tomorrow may possibly not come.
That is why I allow myself much more, I live the life that is much closer to the
“ideal life” in my imagination. I am building the life of my dreams right now,
to the extent it is possible. (17).
As one of our informants said:
I have got some insatiable appetite for life, some extraordinary one, I did not
have it before the war, I was more like going with the flow, and here I have got
some INCREDIBLE appetite for living, showing myself, not prohibiting things
to myself but allowing them to happen, cognising, moving forward and just
feeling everything on my own skin. (17)

Unlike optimistic fatalists, their coping strategies are not just the strate-
gies at the level of internal feelings and observation (passive strategies),
they are related to actions – to change in one’s profession, to change life
(17), “I generally tried to be busy all the time at the beginning … unloading
humanitarian aid, loading humanitarian aid, participating in something to
be busy, Since if a person is busy all the time, he has less time for thinking”
(18), to work – “this was difficult over the first month, since there was a lot
of information, uncertainty, stress, fear, bombardment… But work helped …” (14; 15). The process of adaptation is like exercising:
You come there, you find it difficult. You come again, you find it difficult
again, but it becomes easier with time, and everything depends on the time, I
would say that the more time passes, the easier it will all be for us and for our
society (23).

Hence, ideal representatives of rational optimism consider the action
behaviour model – “go and do your job which you have chosen for your-
self. Or support the economy, or be a volunteer, or be a serviceman. Don’t
idle” (6). If a person keeps working and doing his job in the stressful situa-
tion of the war, all this tension and stress will be relieved with time.

Thus, the rational optimist’s position gets disclosed via the discourse of
daily life in wartime denoted by us as the active present discourse. It aims to clar-
ify in the most detailed way the problems – the circumstances and the causes
of the war in this case. In this discourse war does not seem to be unavoidable.
War is the choice, and in this war the choice of Ukrainians definitely depended
on the choice of the Russian side – to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The attempts to clarify the potentially positive role war plays in the daily life
of Ukrainians also constitutes a characteristic of the discourse within this posi-
tion. The most characteristic feature of the rational optimist’s position can be
disclosure of the capacity to act while adapting to the daily life of the wartime.
It is via activity that the problems of society and individuals are solved, and via
activity that the prospects for the future of Ukraine open up.
CONCLUSION

The identified positions and discourses of daily life characteristic of them differ by the degree of manifestation of personification of the causes of the war, demand for different aspects of information and degree of being critical while assessing its reliability, correlation of the external and personal focusing on the changes in life as well as correlation of pro-active and unique behaviour. Common for all positions and discourses is the rather well-manifested propensity to distancing if not from the present-day war life, then at least to decreasing the intensity of suffering. That correlates well with the identified trends of attention shift towards the external while living under unpredictable circumstances and in the conditions of ongoing armed conflicts (Singh, et al., 2021), since this enables us to reduce the intensity of the psychological distress of the war which has a destructive and traumatic effect in the conditions of long-lasting impact of information about the war (Surzykiewicz et al., 2022). Such distancing protects against the trauma caused by the loss of normality of peaceful life, reduces the sense of loss in people’s minds, preserves the resources and protects against destructive consequences for mental health (Hobfoll et al., 1991; Hobfoll et al., 2015). Another example of such distancing may well be propensity to be concerned about one’s relatives more than about oneself, and for the future of Ukraine more than for one’s own future. The informants almost fail do not mention any intensive negative feelings. Probably, this semi-structured interview is still not an in-depth one, that is why is does not show any in-depth feelings. But the manifested emotions and feelings would have to be mentioned as, for example, in our study of the experience of the pandemic (Klimanska et al., 2020; Klymanska et al., 2021). Propensity not to recognise, or even not to notice the symptoms of emotional distress and not to link it to the effect of the war is well-known (Summerfield, 1999). Similarity of all the three discourses is also manifested in the optimistic emphasis in the positions. Positive image of the future has a resilient effect unlike fatalistic orientation at the present (Haletska et al., 2022).

Peaceful daily life of civilian Ukrainians has undergone drastic changes as the result of its transformation into the daily life in wartime in the conditions of the brutal war launched by Russia. Such painful destructions as making holes in the routine daily life and developed problematic enclaves, on the one hand, prevent development of new patterns of daily life, but, on the other hand, protect against excessive traumatizing.

We see identification of the dynamics of daily life discourse development with due account of the duration of the martial law and objective situation with war events as the prospect for further research. Another important approach could be combination of theme-centered in-depth interviews and quantitative methods in a study.
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